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While openness to trade is a well-recognized hallmark of many successful emerging market economies
known as “growth miracles,” another component of the growth model is a leapfrogging strategy –
the use of policies to guide the industrial structural transformation ahead of a country's factor endowment.
Does the leapfrogging strategy work? Opinions vary but the evidence is scarce in part because it is
more difficult to measure the degree of leapfrogging than the extent of trade openness. We undertake
a systematic look at the evidence across countries to assess the efficacy of such a strategy. So far, there
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All countries want to grow fast on a sustained basis. In East Asia, for example, many 
economies excel in this area. Following Japan after World War II, the “four little dragons” – 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong – are by now familiar success stories. Many more 
economies in the region, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, quickly followed, 
achieving higher growth rates than most other developing countries that had a comparable level 
of development in the 1960s. Since 2000, China, India and Vietnam are the new “growth 
miracles” – achieving the same high growth rates as their neighbors for 2-3 decades in a row.
1 
Naturally, this record invites admiration and scrutiny. What is the Asian growth model? Is it 
something that can be transplanted to Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere, and have the same 
magic effect? 
While the growth records of these economies are (almost) uncontroversial, what is 
responsible for the growth results is subject to debate. At the risk of over-simplification, we 
suggest that two aspects of these economies’ growth model merit particular attention. First, 
almost all high-growing emerging market economies since the 1970s embrace trade openness. 
Trade barriers are taken down or progressively reduced either at the start of the growth process 
or not long after the start of the process. Trade liberalization doesn’t have to take the narrow 
form of reducing tariff rates on imported goods, although that is often part of the process. It can 
take the form of de-monopolizing and de-licensing. While the right to import and export used to 
be concentrated in a small number of firms by government regulations, trade liberalization 
broadens the set of firms that could directly participate in international trade. Even holding tariff 
rates constant, such “democratization” of trading rights could dramatically increase a country’s 
trade openness. This was a significant part of the Chinese trade liberalization in the 1980s. Trade 
liberalization can also come in conjunction with reducing entry barriers or offering incentives for 
foreign firms to jump start the domestic export industry. This may be particularly important for 
those countries that have been isolated from the world market for a while.  Sometimes, the Asian 
model is called an “outward-oriented strategy.” This is not very accurate since many Asian 
                                                 
1 Myanmar (Burma) also consistently has reported double-digit real GDP growth rates every year since 2001, but 
international financial institutions and other observers appear to be somewhat skeptical about the reliability of the 
statistics. Chinese official growth rates are sometimes challenged for their veracity, although most scholars, 
economists of major international investment banks, and international financial institutions take the view that the 
officially released figures are reliable. (Or, if there is a bias, the bias could be either positive or negative.)  
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economies do not simultaneously embrace capital account openness, at least not by the same 
degree in the areas of cross-border portfolio equity and portfolio debt flows.  
The second aspect of the growth model is the use of government policies to promote high-
tech and high domestic value-added industries, presumably beyond what the economies would 
naturally develop if left to their own devices. This aspect may be labeled as a leapfrogging 
strategy. China, Singapore, and Malaysia all have various aggressive policies to promote certain 
high value added sectors. Other countries in the region do not wish to fall behind. For example, 
Philippines’ National Information Technology Council announced in 1997: “Within the first 
decade of the 21
st Century, the Philippines will be a knowledge center in the Asia Pacific region: 
the leader in IT education, in IT-assisted training, and in the application of information and 
knowledge to business, professional services, and the arts.” 
Are these two aspects responsible for the growth success? The first aspect – the role of trade 
openness in economic growth – has been subject to extensive (and intensive) scholarly scrutiny. 
While there is notable skepticism (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000), most economists read the 
evidence as suggesting that trade openness does help to promote economic growth.  Following 
and extending the work by Frankel and Romer (1999), Feyrer (2009), in a recent paper that pays 
attention to sorting out causality from correlation, again shows that greater trade openness 
causally leads to a rise in income. Using changes in infant mortality and life expectancy as an 
alternative measure of well-being, Wei and Wu (2004) present evidence that trade openness 
helps to improve social welfare by reducing infant mortality and raising life expectancy to a 
degree beyond raising per capita income. Based on an overwhelming amount of evidence, we 
lean strongly toward believing that trade openness has played a key role in the success stories in 
Asia, and indeed in most high and sustained growth episodes in the world.  
How about the second aspect of the growth model? Has a leapfrogging strategy played a key 
role as well? In comparison to the trade openness issue, there is far less scholarly work on the 
effectiveness of a leapfrogging strategy. In theory, if the production of sophisticated goods 
generates positive externalities via learning-by-doing, then there generally would be an under-
investment among private economic agents relative to the socially optimal level. A leapfrogging 
strategy – a government-led industrial policy that tilts resource allocation to technologically 
sophisticated industries – could correct this market failure.  The natural inference from this 
argument suggests that a country may benefit more from exporting sophisticated products than  
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from exporting unsophisticated and low domestic value-added products, even if its comparative 
advantage in the current time is to produce the latter type of goods.  Recent academic studies 
have reported evidence supporting such comparative advantage-defying development strategy.  
In Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) (henceforth, abbreviated as HHR), the authors suggest 
that some export goods have higher spillover effects than others.  They develop a measure of 
export sophistication and find that a positive relationship exists between their measure and the 
country’s subsequent economic growth rate.  However, there is no shortage of skepticism toward 
the leapfrogging growth strategy. On one hand, one might question the size of any such market 
failure in the real world if there is one. On the other hand, one might wonder whether the 
existence of a “government failure,” if it were to pursue a leapfrogging strategy, could 
overwhelm whatever benefits a country may derive from correcting the market failure. In a series 
of papers, including Lin (2009), the World Bank chief economist Justin Lin advocates strongly 
for development strategies that follow a country’s comparative advantage, and against what he 
calls “comparative advantage defying strategies” which include a leapfrogging industrial policy. 
(At the same time, Lin is open to the idea of a government role in helping private firms to find 
“latent comparative advantage” (Lin, 2010).)  
  In this paper, we aim to test the validity of the leapfrogging hypothesis with fresh 
evidence from a cross-country data set. One bottleneck in testing this hypothesis is to identify 
which countries (regions) engage in such a growth strategy.
2 We employ four different measures 
including a new indicator that is based on the proportion of identifiable high-tech products in a 
country’s exports.  
  Overall, it is difficult to find strong and robust evidence that a leapfrogging strategy 
contributes to a higher growth rate. In other words, the empirical investigation does not support 
the contention that a government intervention that is aimed at raising a country’s technological 
sophistication beyond what is expected of its level of development could produce a better growth 
result on a sustained basis.   
  There are important caveats for our approach that should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results. Our measures of a country’s leapfrogging strategy are based on its export 
data. To the extent that a country’s export structure may not accurately capture its production 
structure, we may have missed some true leapfrogging strategies. In addition, the efficacy of a 
                                                 
2 Literature review of previous tests of the hypothesis will be added in the next revision.  
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leapfrogging strategy could be more subtle than what is being tested in this paper. For example, 
it is conceptually possible that only when several policy instruments are implemented as a 
package can the positive effect of a leapfrogging strategy be detected. Because of these 
qualifications, we view the current paper as a stepping stone toward a more comprehensive 
examination of the leapfrogging strategy. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses our measures of leapfrogging. 
Section 3 examines the empirical connections between technological leapfrogging and economic 
growth rate. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Statistical Specification and Leapfrogging Measurement 
 
  A key to this exercise is to assess whether a country pursues a leapfrogging strategy, and, 
if it does, what the degree of leapfrogging is. Ideally, we would want to compare a country’s 
actual production structure with what would have been predicted based on its factor endowment. 
There are two challenges. First, data on production structure by an internationally comparable 
classification are not available for most countries, especially developing countries for which 
evaluating the efficacy of a leapfrogging strategy is most pertinent. Second, even when 
internationally comparable production data are available, one gets only a relatively coarse 
classification, with less than 100 sectors. Many differences in the economic structure do not 
reveal themselves at such an aggregate level. For example, many countries have electronics 
industries, but different types of electronic products may have very different levels of skill 
content. We address these challenges by looking at trade data instead. Generally speaking, a 
country’s export structure closely resembles its production structure. Trade data are available for 
a much larger set of economies (over 250 in the WITS database). At the most detailed and still 
internationally comparable level (Harmonized System 6-digit, there are over 5000 products a 
country can export (or import). To control for the “normal” amount of sophistication based on a 
country’s factor endowment, we include a country’s income and education levels as controls in a 
growth regression framework. 
In the rest of the section, we first review two existing measures of export sophistication in the 
literature, and propose two additional measures that may address some shortcomings of the 
existing measures. We then describe the data that we use to implement the measures. Finally, we  
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conduct some simple “smell checks” to see how well these measures capture those countries that 
are commonly reported as having a leapfrogging industrial policy. 
 
2.1 Regression specification 
We consider a growth regression specification of the following type: 
 
  it it it it it k it X ExpSophis LnGDPc = LnGDPc LnGDPc ω α α α + Γ + + + − + 2 1 0      (1) 
 
The left-hand-side variable measures the growth rate for country i from year t to year t+k. In 
most cases, we examine the growth performance from 1992 to 2003.  LnGDPcit denotes the 
natural log of per capita GDP for country i in year t, ExpSophisit denotes the level of economic 
sophistication measured using trade data, and Xit is a vector of other control variables. 
Coefficient α2 measures the impact of leapfrogging policies.  
 
2.2 Measures of a country’s industrial sophistication based on export data 
While it is difficult to directly measure a country’s industrial sophistication, in part because 
the standard industrial classification is too coarse for this purpose, the existing literature has 
considered proxies based on the data on a country’s export bundles. The idea is that, leaving 
aside non-tradable goods, the structure of the export bundle should mimic that of production.  
One measure is the level of income implied in the export bundle, introduced in Hausmann, 
Hwang, and Rodrik (2007).  This measure builds on the concept that the degree of sophistication 
in a country’s exports can be inferred by the income level of each good’s exporter.  The second 
measure is the Export Dissimilarity Index (EDI), introduced by Schott (2007) and adopted by 
Wang and Wei (2010), which gauges the distance between a country’s export structure and that 
of high-income economies such as Japan, the U.S. and the European Union (EU15).  Both 
measures assume that higher income countries, on average, produce more sophisticated products. 
One can avoid making this arbitrary assumption, and focus on the degree of technological 
sophistication of the product itself, based on a classification of high-tech “advanced technology 




Income implied in a country’s export bundle (EXPY) 
This indicator of export sophistication is a measure of the typical income associated with 
a given country’s export basket. For every good, one can compute the “typical income” 
(PRODY) of the countries that export the good, or the weighted average of the income levels 
across the exporters of this good, with weights proportional to the value of the exports by 
countries. For any given exporter, one can look at its export basket and compute the weighted 
average of the typical income levels across all products in the basket, with the weights 
proportional to the value of each good in the basket. The key underlying assumption here is that 
advanced countries produce more sophisticated goods and poorer countries produce less 
sophisticated goods.    
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Where sik is the share of country k’s exports in product i,Yk is country k’s per capita GDP.  Table 
1 displays the summary statistics for the EXPY over the time period 1992-2006. 
There are two major merits of this index. First, it does not require one to tediously sift 
through and classify goods as “sophisticated goods” or “high tech products.” Second, it can be 
computed easily with data in trade flows and GDP per capita.  But it also has several 
weaknesses.  First, the key assumption underlying PRODY, that more advanced countries 
produce sophisticated goods, may not be true.  Advanced countries often produce a larger set of 
goods than poor countries.  Furthermore, larger countries also produce a larger set of goods than 
smaller countries.  These features suggest that the PRODY index may over-weight advanced and 
large countries.  Second, the index may conceal diversity in the quality and type of goods in finer 
details within a product category.  Third, the index fails to capture processing trade, where a 
country imports sophisticated product parts to produce the final sophisticated product.  This is 
the case in China, where a significant share of sophisticated exports is based on processing trade.  
Given the weaknesses of the EXPY index, we construct the following index in hopes of avoiding 




Unit value adjusted implied income in the export bundle - Modified EXPY 
In this modified version of the EXPY index, we discount the PRODY of each good by 
the ratio of the unit value of the exporter to the mean unit value of the same goods in G3 (The 














= PRODY • • ∑ ∑
        ( 3 )  
The modified EXPY is computed similarly as in the original EXPY index in equation (2).   
The motivation of this modification is our belief that the unit value data adds an 
additional layer of differentiation among goods of different quality or varieties.  This can take 
account of the diversity within the 6-digit HS category.  The assumption behind this modification 
is that unit value is a proxy for quality, and the G3 countries export higher quality goods. 
Since we only have unit value of products at the 6-digit HS level across the world for 
2005, we apply the same unit value discount factor to the PRODY during our whole sample 
period.  Table 2 shows the summary statistics of this modified EXPY.   
 
Distance to the export bundle by high-income countries 
We define an index for a lack of sophistication by the dissimilarity between the structure 
of a country (city)’s exports and that of the G3 economies or the export dissimilarity index 
(EDI), as: 




irt rft s s abs = EDI ∑ −         ( 4 )  
 
w h e r e                 ( 5 )  
           
where sirft is the share of HS product i at the 6-digit level in a country (city) r’s exports at year t, 
and si,t
ref
 is the share of HS product i in the 6-digit level exports of G3 developed countries. The 
greater the value of the index, the more dissimilar the compared export structures are. If the two 
export structures were identical, then the value of the index would be zero; if the two export 
structures were to have no overlap, then the index would take the value of 200. We regard an 











use the similarity index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott (2006) 
(except for the scale): 
ESIrft = 100 min
i
∑ (sirft , si,t
ref)          ( 6 )  
This index is bounded by zero and 100. If a country (city) r’s export structure had no overlap 
with that of the G3 developed countries, then ESI would be zero; if the two export structures had 
a perfect overlap, then the index would take the value of 100.  It can be verified that there is a 
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Share of Advanced Technology Products in total exports – ATP share 
Besides the measures already in the literature, we also propose a new measure on the 
share of high-tech products in a country’s exports bundle that does not require assuming that 








ATPSH 100 =          ( 8 )  
where 
ATP
it EXP  is exports of ATP of country i at time t, 
TOT
it EXP  is total exports of country i at 
time t. This measure of export sophistication requires us to specifically define what is meant by 
“high-tech exports”; thus it sacrifices EXPY’s simplicity.  
To compute this measure, one needs an expert definition of which product is high-tech.   
Two lists of expert definitions are well respected. One is developed by the U.S. Census Bureau, 
which identified about 700 product categories as “Advanced Technology Products” (ATP) from 
about 20,000 10-digit HS codes used by the United States. The other is developed by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which identified 195 
product categories from 5-digit SITC codes as “high tech” products. Because the Harmonized 
System classification (HS) is more detailed and is cross-country comparable at the 6-digit level, 
we concord both lists into 6-digit HS product categories. We convert the OECD “high tech” 
product list to 328 6-digit HS codes based on concordance between SITC (rev3) and HS (2002) 
published by the United Nations Statistical Division.    
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To condense the U.S. Census ATP list from 10-digit HS to 6-digit HS, we first calculate 
the ATP value share in both U.S. imports from the world at the HS-6 level based on U.S. trade 
statistics in 2006, bearing in mind that within each HS-6 heading, some of the U.S. HTS-10 lines 
are considered to be ATP and others are not.  We choose two separate cutoff points. For a narrow 
ATP definition, we select the 6-digit HS categories which the ATP share is 100 percent in total 
U.S. imports from the world according to the Census ATP list, which resulted in 92 HS-6 lines. 
For a wider ATP definition, we select the 6-digit HS categories which the ATP share is at least 
25 percent in total  U.S. imports from the world, which resulted in 157 HS-6 lines. We use the 6-
digit HS code in which all products are in the Census ATP list and also in the OECD “high tech” 
product list as our narrow definition of ATP. For a wider ATP definition, we deem an HS-6 line 
as ATP when either it is in the OECD high-tech product list or at least 25 percent of its value is 
ATP products in U.S. imports from the world according to the Census ATP list.   
The recent literature also documents significant variations within the same product. 
Although both developed and developing countries may export products under the same 6-digit 
HS code, their unit value usually varies significantly, largely reflecting the difference in quality 
between their exports. To allow for the possibility that a very large difference in the unit values 
may signal different products (that are misclassified as in the same 6-digit category), we take unit 
value for all products from Japan, EU15 and the United States (G3) in our narrow ATP definition 
as reference, and any products with unit value below the G3 unit value minus 5 times standard 
deviation will not be counted as ATP. This gives our third definition of ATP.           
 
2.3 Data and Basic Facts 
The EXPY measure requires data on trade flow and GDP per capita.  We computed 
EXPY for both a short and a long sample.  For the short sample, dating from 1992 to 2006, the 
data on country exports come from the United Nations’ COMTRADE database, downloaded 
from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The data from 1992 to 2006 is at the 6 digit 
HS (1988/1992 version) covering 5016 product categories and 167 countries.  For the long 
sample, dating from 1962-2000, the trade flow data are taken from the NBER-UN data compiled 
by Feenstra et al., which could be downloaded from the NBER website.  The data is at 4 digit 
SITC, revision 2, covering 700 to more than 1000 product categories and 72 countries.  The GDP 
per capita data on PPP basis is taken from the Penn World Table.  
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The modified EXPY measure in addition requires data on unit value.  The data are 
obtained from Ferrantino, Feinberg, and Deason (2008), which in turn are obtained from the 
United Nations’ COMTRADE database.  The data is only for the year 2005, and is cleaned of 
products that do not have well defined quantity units, have inconsistent reporting, have small 
value, or have unit value belonging to a 2.5 percent tail of the distribution of the product’s unit 
values.  In total, the resulting unit value dataset covers 3628 6-digit HS subheadings. 
The other two export sophistication indices – EDI and ATP share (narrow, broad) – are 
computed excluding HS Chapters 1-27 (agricultural and mineral products) as well as  raw 
materials and their simple transformations (mostly at HS 4-digit level) in other HS chapters. A 
list of excluded products is reported in Appendix Table 1. Each country’s ATP exports share is 
computed by the country’s ATP exports divided by its total manufacturing exports.  Our sample 
of countries is listed in Appendix Table 2. 
The other explanatory variables included in the growth regressions are human capital, 
GDP per capita, and institutional quality.  The human capital variable in the cross country 
regressions uses the average school year in the Barro-Lee education database.  GDP per capita is 
on PPP basis and taken from the Penn World Table.  The institutional quality variable is proxies 




3.  Do Leapfroggers Grow Faster? An Examination of Cross-country Evidence 
 
3.1 The Elusive Growth Effect of a Leapfrogging Strategy 
  Since Hausman et al. (2007) is the most recent and the best known paper that is supposed 
to have provided an empirical foundation for the proposition that a leapfrogging strategy as 
measured by a country’s export sophistication delivers a faster economic growth rate, we start 
our statistical analysis by taking a careful look at their specification, with a view to check the 
robustness of their conclusion. In particular, we follow their econometric strategy, regressing 
economic growth rate across countries on a leapfrogging measure and other control variables that 
are typically included in empirical growth papers.  After replicating their regressions with EXPY 
                                                 
3 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ and http://ww1.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi .  
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as the leapfrogging proxy, we use the alternative measures discussed above – modified EXP, the 
EDI indicator, and the ATP shares.   
Table 1 shows our replication of the HHR’s cross-section regressions for the short sample 
of 1992-2003 (corresponding to their Table 8).  The controls include human capital and a 
measure of institutional quality.   Since the source of their “rule of law” index is not clearly 
stated, we use four other well-known institution variables:  corruption, government effectiveness, 
regulation quality, and the CPI score.  In the OLS regressions, the coefficients on the first three 
institution measures are significant; in particular, the coefficient on regulation quality (0.013) is 
close to HHR’s coefficient on their rule of law index (0.011).   Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8 in Table 1 
can be compared to the corresponding regression in HHR’s Table 8; the coefficients on the initial 
GDP per capita and human capital variables are basically the same as HHR’s.  While the 
coefficients on log initial EXPY have different magnitudes than HHR’s results for the same 
sample period of 1992-2003, they are all statistically significant (though not as strong, depending 
on the institution variable) and are positive as HHR’s.  A possible explanation for this difference 
in the size of the coefficients is that trade data for the countries in the 1992-2003 sample has 
been revised since their usage. The bottom line from this replication exercise is that their results 
can be replicated.  
In the next step, we replace the EXPY variable with alternative measures of export 
sophistications—modified EXPY, EDI, and the ATP shares—and re-estimated the regressions.  
The results for each of these respective variables are displayed in Tables 2-5.  In Table 2, the 
coefficient on the modified EXPY is statistically insignificant in all but the first specification 
with only human capital as control, even as the direction of the coefficients and significance on 
initial GDP per capita, human capital, and institution variables remains the same as in Table 1.  
This observation extends to the case where either EDI or the broad definition of ATP is used as 
the export sophistication measure, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.  However, the coefficient on the 
ATP share using a more stringent definition is positively significant across all specification.  We 
will show in the next section that even this result is not robust. 
To summarize, the positive association between a country’s export sophistication and 
economic growth rate is not a strong and robust pattern of the data. In particular, alternative 
measures of export sophistication often produce statistically insignificant coefficients. For 
example, a reasonable adjustment to the HHR measure of sophistication by taking into account  
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possible differences in unit values when computing the implied income in an export bundle 
would render the positive association to disappear. We therefore infer that it may be too early to 
conclude that pursuing a leapfrogging strategy would raise a country’s growth rate. 
 
3.2 Does growth in sophistication lead to growth in income?   
It is possible that the level of a country’s export sophistication may not capture well policy 
incentives or other government actions. In particular, if a country pursues an education policy 
that generates an unusually large pool of scientists and engineers, its level of export 
sophistication may surpass what can be predicted based solely on its income or endowment. A 
useful alternative empirical strategy is to look at the growth of a country’s export sophistication. 
Holding constant the initial levels of export sophistication, would those that have an unusually 
fast increase in sophistication also have an unusually high rate of economic growth? 
In Table 6, we rank the 49 countries in our sample by descending order in the pace of the 
growth of their export sophistication. As a smell test, we pay particular attention to where Ireland 
and China fit by this metric as both countries are often said to be examples of extensive 
government programs to promote industrial transformation toward high-tech industries. While all 
five measures are able to capture China as having experienced a high level of change in its 
export sophistication, only the modified EXPY variable is able to capture both China and Ireland 
as having undergone a significant change in export sophistication.  This again strengthens our 
confidence in the relative adequacy of the modified EXPY against the original EXPY in 
capturing leapfrogging in industrial structure. 
Table 7 displays the regression results with this specification for all five export sophistication 
measures and their changes over the period 1992-2003.  The initial GDP level, human capital, 
and institution variable all have the correct signs.  None of the export sophistication growth 
variables enters significantly into the regression.  But the most conspicuous observation is the 
initial export sophistication measures: all but the EXPY variable are insignificant with this 
specification.  In contrast to the previous specification, the ATP share is no longer significant 
either.  This once again shows that when export sophistication is constructed in alternative ways, 
it no longer indicates significant impact on growth.  To summarize, these results cast doubt on 
the view that leapfrogging leads to higher growth. 
     
 
13
3.3 Panel regressions with instrumental variables 
The cross section regressions assume that productivity growth is the same for all countries 
except for differences in the leapfrog policies. As an extension that relaxes this assumption, we 
turn to a panel analysis with separate country fixed effects.  New challenges emerge with the 
panel analysis: one has to deal with shorter time intervals and has to have instrumental variables 
that have meaningful time series variations.   
We do not have clever instrumental variables. For lack of better ones, we experiment with 
the idea that professional background and educational preparedness of a political leader may 
affect his/her choice of economic strategy, and are therefore candidates for instrumental 
variables.  The idea is imported from Dreher, Lamla, Lein, and Somogyi (2009). After 
constructing a database of profession and education for more than 500 political leaders from 73 
countries for the period 1970-2002, these authors find that pro-market reforms are more likely to 
be proposed and implemented by leaders who are former entrepreneurs and former scientists. 
Educational background sometimes has an influence but the effect is not robust. We follow their 
approach and in fact borrow their data set. One set of dummies codify the educational 
background for chief executives:  law, economics, politics, natural science, and other. Another 
set of dummies codify the professions of chief executives before they take office:  entrepreneur, 
white collar, blue collar, union executive, and science, economics, law, military, politician, and 
others. We use this set of variables as instruments for export sophistication. 
These instruments are not ideal.  In the first stage regressions (not reported), we cannot 
confirm the findings by Dreher et al (2009) that former entrepreneurs or former scientists-turned 
politicians do things differently in the context of a leapfrogging strategy. However, there is some 
evidence that leaders who are former blue collar workers or former labor union executives are 
more likely to pursue a leapfrogging strategy (when leapfrogging is measured by the criterion of 
EDI). There is also some evidence that life-time politicians are more likely to pursue a 
leapfrogging strategy.  
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test fails to reject the null that the OLS and the IV 
estimates are different (with a p-value of 0.50). This might imply that there is no significant 
endogeneity issue in the current context, and that an IV approach is not necessary. On the other 
hand, the F statistics (for the null that all regressors are jointly zero) is only 3.08. So we cannot 
rule out the possibility that these leader background variables are weak instruments.   
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For what it is worth, Table 8 shows the second-stage growth regression results for the long 
sample of 1970-2000, for using EXPY and EDI as measures of export sophistication.  
Unfortunately, we cannot use the ATP shares as they are not available for early years.  Panel A 
shows the results for using EXPY as export sophistication. To compare with the analysis in 
Hausman et al., our sample starts a few years later (as opposed to their 1962-2000).  Our OLS 
estimation closely replicates their estimates:  the coefficient on initial GDP per capita is negative 
and significant at –0.001, the coefficient on initial EXPY is positive and significant at 0.02, and 
the coefficient on human capital is positive and significant at 0.01. In the fixed effects and IV 
specifications, neither of the coefficients on initial EXPY is significant, despite the improved 
Hansen-J statistics given our set of instruments. The R-squared of our regression for the OLS 
case is more than twice as large as theirs, despite the similarities in the estimates. Panel B shows 
the results for the same regression except replacing EXPY with EDI.  None of the export 
sophistication variables are significant, while the initial GDP per capita and human capital 
variables are both significant. We conclude that in the panel regressions, there is no strong and 
robust support for the notion that a leapfrogging strategy promotes growth (subject to the caveat 
that we may not have found powerful instruments). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
To be able to transform an economy’s economic structure ahead of its income level toward 
higher domestic value added and more sophisticated sectors is desirable in abstract. Many 
governments have pursued policies to bring out such transformations. To be sure, there are 
examples of individual success cases – promotion of a certain industry by government policies 
that result in an expansion of that industry. However, any such policy promotion takes away 
resources from other industries, especially those that are consistent with the country’s factor 
endowment and level of development. On balance, the effect is conceptually less clear. Given the 
popularity of such leapfrogging strategies, it is important to evaluate empirically if they work. 
Unfortunately, such an evaluation is difficult because it is not straightforward to quantify the 
degree of leapfrogging an economy may exhibit. Typical data on production structures are not 
refined enough. Most relevant policies are not easily quantifiable or comparable across countries.  
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One way to gauge the degree of leapfrogging is by inferring from a country’s detailed 
export data. This paper pursues this strategy. It develops a number of different ways to measure 
leapfrogging from revealed sophistication in a country’s exports, recognizing that any particular 
measure may have both advantages and shortcomings. 
  After a whole battery of analyses, a succinct summary of the findings is a lack of strong 
and robust support for the notion that a leapfrogging industrial policy can reliably raise economic 
growth. Again, there may be individual success stories. But there are failures. If leapfrogging is a 
policy gamble, there is no systematic evidence that suggests that the odds are favorable. 
  We conclude by noting again two distinct aspects of a growth model that embraces the 
world market. The first aspect is export orientation – an investment environment with few policy 
impediments to firms participating in international trade. While this paper does not reproduce the 
vast quantity of analysis on this, we do not doubt its validity. The second aspect is leapfrogging – 
the use of policy instruments to engineer a faster industrial transformation than what may emerge 
naturally based on an economy’s stage of development and factor endowment. We cast some 
doubt on how effective such a strategy is empirically.  
  There is important follow-up research to be done. First, part of the leapfrogging strategy 
works on the “import side,” which our current empirical strategy doesn’t capture fully – for 
example, the use of tariff and other policies to reduce imports of high-tech or high-value added 
products in order to give domestically produced substitutes some space. One can imagine ways 
in which such a strategy could backfire. But a systematic examination of the data would be 
useful.  Second, while a leapfrogging strategy may not work in general, there are moderate or 
subtle version of the strategy that aims not to defy comparative advantage generally, but to 
explore “latent comparative advantage” – the economical structure that a country would have 
evolved into naturally in the next stage. Is a pattern of “latent comparative advantage” 
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Table 1:  Cross National Growth Regressions Using EXPY as Proposed by Hausman et al, 1992-2003 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992-2003 
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.011  -0.02  -0.025  -0.026  -0.03 -0.023  -0.009  -0.017  -0.025 -0.025  -0.024  -0.02 
 [0.005]*  [0.007]**  [0.007]**  [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]  [0.011] [0.012]* [0.010]*  [0.011]*  [0.012] 
log  initial  EXPY  0.036 0.029 0.025 0.019 0.03  0.027 0.031  0.023  0.023  0.016 0.025 0.023 
 [0.011]**  [0.011]*  [0.010]*  [0.010] [0.010]**  [0.011]*  [0.014]*  [0.015] [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.014] 
log  human  capital    0.033 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.029   0.03  0.029  0.024 0.016 0.029 
    [0.012]* [0.012]* [0.010]* [0.010]* [0.013]*   [0.017]  [0.015]*  [0.012]* [0.012]  [0.016] 
corruption    0.008         0.008     
    [0.003]*         [0.004]     
government  effectiveness     0.013          0.013    
     [0.003]**          [0.004]**    
regulation  quality     0.021          0.018   
      [0.005]**          [0.006]**   
cpi  score       0.002          0.001 
       [0.001]          [0.002] 
Constant  -0.193 -0.114 -0.023 0.041  -0.029 -0.066 -0.168  -0.079  -0.014 0.054  -0.019  -0.057 
 [0.066]**  [0.072]  [0.065]  [0.074] [0.061] [0.070] [0.078]*  [0.080] [0.064]  [0.069]  [0.062]  [0.072] 
Observations  52 42 42 42 42 42 52  42  42  42 42 42 
R-squared  0.24 0.35 0.41 0.5  0.53 0.38            
Hansen  J        0.93  1.69  1.61  0.82  0.35  1.95 




Table 2:  Alternative Measure of Export Sophistication – Unit Value Adjusted Implied Income in the Export Bundle: Modified EXPY, 1992-2003 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992-2003  
        
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  IV  IV IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.004  -0.016  -0.02  -0.023  -0.022 -0.018 -0.005 -0.017  -0.032 -0.034  -0.031  -0.022 
  [0.004]  [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.005]  [0.011] [0.017] [0.012]** [0.013]* [0.016] 
log  initial  modified  EXPY  0.011 0.009  0.004 -0.001  0.004 0.006 0.012 0.01  0.006  -0.001  0.005  0.008 
 [0.004]**  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004]**  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]  [0.006] 
log  human  capital    0.033  0.03  0.027 0.025 0.031   0.035  0.041  0.038 0.033  0.035 
   [0.014]*  [0.013]*  [0.011]*  [0.012]  [0.014]*   [0.023] [0.024] [0.016]* [0.018] [0.024] 
corruption     0.009        0.013      
     [0.003]*        [0.009]     
government  effectiveness      0.016         0.021     
      [0.004]**         [0.007]**     
regulation  quality       0.019         0.024   
       [0.007]*         [0.010]*  
cpi  score        0.002          0.002 
        [0.002]          [0.003] 
Constant  -0.024  0.037  0.123 0.195 0.144 0.077 -0.023  0.038  0.188  0.264 0.193  0.085 
 [0.029]  [0.043]  [0.052]*  [0.061]**  [0.052]**  [0.050] [0.029] [0.048] [0.125] [0.103]* [0.086]* [0.089] 
Observations  52 42  42 42 42 42 52 42  42  42 42  42 
R-squared  0.17 0.28  0.34 0.45 0.4  0.3             
Hansen  J         0.11  1.05  1.22  0.66  0.13  1.49 
Chi-sq p-value                    0.74  0.31  0.27  0.42  0.72  0.22 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets;  Instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land) ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
20
Table 3:  Cross National Growth Regressions with ATP Share (Narrow Definition), 1992-2003  
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992-2003                      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.002  -0.015  -0.021  -0.023  -0.022 -0.019 -0.008 -0.017 -0.033 -0.026  -0.03 -0.026 
 [0.003]  [0.006]*  [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]* [0.006]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.014] [0.020] [0.020] 
initial ATP share (narrow)  0.087  0.076  0.069  0.049  0.056  0.07  0.112  0.083  0.077  0.05  0.055  0.081 
 [0.026]**  [0.027]** [0.024]** [0.027]  [0.023]* [0.025]** [0.034]**  [0.030]** [0.022]** [0.025]* [0.022]* [0.024]**
log  human  capital    0.036 0.03  0.027 0.026 0.031   0.041 0.042 0.03 0.035  0.039 
    [0.014]* [0.013]* [0.011]* [0.013]  [0.014]*   [0.032]  [0.023]  [0.018] [0.023] [0.026] 
corruption    0.009       0.015       
    [0.003]**      [0.009]       
government  effectiveness     0.014       0.015     
     [0.004]**      [0.008]*    
regulation  quality     0.018        0.024   
      [0.006]**       [0.015]   
cpi  score       0.003         0.004 
       [0.002]         [0.004] 
Constant  0.054 0.098 0.164 0.181 0.172 0.129 0.105 0.112 0.241 0.198  0.225  0.173 
 [0.030]  [0.036]** [0.045]** [0.043]** [0.042]** [0.044]** [0.056] [0.071] [0.119]* [0.088]* [0.124] [0.111] 
Observations  52 42 42 42 42 42 52 42 42 42  42  42 
R-squared  0.13 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.36            
Hansen  J        0  0.59  0.16  0.02  0.07  0.72 
Chi-sq p-value                    0.97  0.44  0.69  0.88  0.78  0.4 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets; Instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land) ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 4:  Cross National Growth Regressions with ATP Share (Broad) as a Measure of Sophistication, 1992-2003   
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992-2003                         
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  IV IV  IV  IV  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.002  -0.014  -0.021  -0.023  -0.023 -0.019 -0.007 -0.018  -0.033 -0.028  -0.03  -0.027 
 [0.004]  [0.006]* [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]* [0.006]  [0.014]  [0.017] [0.013]* [0.017] [0.018] 
initial ATP share (broad)  0.056  0.041  0.035  0.019  0.031  0.036  0.074  0.049  0.046  0.022  0.034  0.048 
 [0.022]* [0.026]  [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.020] [0.024] [0.028]** [0.028]  [0.020]* [0.020] [0.020]  [0.022]*
log  human  capital    0.036  0.029 0.027 0.025 0.031   0.044  0.041  0.031 0.032  0.039 
    [0.014]* [0.013]* [0.011]* [0.013]  [0.014]*   [0.030]  [0.023] [0.018]  [0.021] [0.026] 
corruption      0.01        0.015      
      [0.003]**       [0.008]      
government  effectiveness       0.015         0.017     
       [0.004]**        [0.007]*     
regulation  quality        0.019         0.024   
        [0.006]**        [0.012]   
cpi  score         0.003          0.004 
         [0.002]          [0.003] 
Constant  0.055  0.097  0.164 0.183 0.178 0.129 0.094 0.118  0.244  0.212 0.222  0.18 
 [0.032]  [0.036]* [0.045]** [0.041]** [0.043]** [0.044]** [0.049] [0.067]  [0.108]* [0.082]** [0.104]* [0.101] 
Observations  52  42  42 42 42 42 52 42  42  42 42  42 
R-squared  0.09  0.26  0.36 0.46 0.41 0.31            
Robust standard errors in brackets                         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%                         
Hansen  J          0.03  1.2  0.48  0.23  0.01  1.34 
Chi-sq p-value                    0.85  0.27  0.49  0.63  0.91  0.25 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets;  Instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land) ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5:  Cross National Growth Regressions with EDI as a Measure of Leapfrogging, 1992-2003 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita over 1992-2003                      
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  IV  IV  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.005  -0.017  -0.024  -0.026  -0.025 -0.021 -0.007  -0.02 -0.035 -0.034 -0.03  -0.031 
 [0.004]  [0.007]*  [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.004] [0.008]* [0.010]** [0.008]** [0.011]** [0.009]**
log initial EDI  -0.025  -0.011  -0.001  0.008  -0.007  -0.002  -0.029 -0.012 -0.011  0.002  -0.01  -0.011 
 [0.012]*  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015]*  [0.017]  [0.014] [0.011] [0.015] [0.015] 
log  human  capital    0.038 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.03    0.044  0.043 0.036 0.031 0.044 
    [0.014]** [0.013]* [0.011]* [0.013]* [0.014]*   [0.019]* [0.017]* [0.014]* [0.016]  [0.018]* 
corruption     0.012         0.016     
     [0.004]**        [0.005]**    
government  effectiveness      0.018         0.021    
      [0.004]**        [0.005]**   
regulation  quality       0.019         0.023   
       [0.007]**        [0.010]*   
cpi  score        0.004         0.005 
        [0.002]*         [0.002]* 
Constant  0.213  0.174 0.195 0.165 0.233 0.162 0.248  0.197  0.318 0.246 0.286 0.264 
 [0.081]*  [0.104]  [0.095]*  [0.083]  [0.108]* [0.097]  [0.103]*  [0.122] [0.114]** [0.085]** [0.130]* [0.111]* 
Observations  52  41 41 41 41 41 52  41  41 41 41 41 
R-squared  0.09  0.23 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.31            
Hansen  J         0.97  1.36  1.26  0.39  0.15  2.08 
Chi-sq p-value                    0.33  0.24  0.26  0.53  0.7  0.15 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets;  Instruments for IV regressions are log(population) and log(land) ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6:  Ranking Growth in Export Sophistication, 1992-2003  






(broad) Country  EDI 
1 Hungary  3.14  Ireland  5.54  Malaysia  1.50  Malaysia  2.01  Australia  -2.32 
2  Bangladesh  3.12  Hungary 4.44  Iceland  1.41  Hungary 1.93  Korea,  Rep.  -1.70 
3 Kenya  3.05  Madagascar 4.38  China  1.20  China  1.88  Oman  -1.56 
4 Madagascar  2.78  Kenya  3.55  Singapore  1.09  Finland  1.31  Hungary  -1.50 
5 Korea,  Rep.  2.10  Ecuador  3.41  Netherlands 0.88  Singapore  1.10  Mexico  -1.46 
6 Thailand  2.07  Indonesia  3.22  Hungary  0.56  Korea,  Rep. 1.09  Kenya  -1.45 
7 China  2.03  South  Africa 3.12  Indonesia  0.50 Iceland  1.08  Greece  -1.42 
8  Trinidad and Tobago  1.96  Bangladesh  3.04  Thailand  0.49  Netherlands  1.04  Thailand  -1.40 
9 Paraguay  1.89  Singapore  3.01  Korea,  Rep. 0.40  Indonesia  0.95  Indonesia  -1.38 
10 Singapore  1.83  China  2.98  Mexico  0.33 Mexico  0.93  Turkey  -1.35 
11 Turkey  1.82  Brunei  2.98  Portugal  0.33 Thailand  0.70  Portugal  -1.28 
12 Colombia  1.50  Turkey 2.91  St.  Lucia  0.20  Greece 0.64  Ecuador -1.09 
13 Iceland  1.40  Malaysia  2.87  Tunisia  0.16 Croatia  0.61  China  -1.02 
14 Malaysia  1.37  Thailand  2.61  Switzerland  0.15 Switzerland  0.59  India  -1.00 
15 Cyprus  1.30  Korea,  Rep.  2.29  Australia  0.15 Brazil  0.54  Spain  -0.98 
16 Bolivia  1.24  Greece  2.05 Finland  0.15 Denmark  0.49 Saudi  Arabia  -0.96 
17  Portugal  1.24  Portugal 1.96  Bolivia  0.13  Portugal 0.45  Malaysia -0.79 
18 Croatia  1.16  Cyprus  1.94  Sweden  0.13 St.  Lucia  0.42  Colombia  -0.73 
19 Greece  1.15  Colombia  1.78  Greece  0.11 Australia  0.39  Sweden  -0.63 
20 Finland  1.12  Tunisia  1.75  Kenya  0.09 New  Zealand 0.39  Denmark  -0.59 
21 India  1.08  Croatia  1.70  Croatia  0.09 Paraguay  0.30  Paraguay  -0.55 
22 Ecuador  1.01  Mexico  1.67  India  0.08 Tunisia  0.26  New  Zealand  -0.54 
23 Mexico  0.99  Iceland  1.41  New  Zealand 0.08 Sweden  0.24  Romania  -0.51 
24 Indonesia  0.90  Sri  Lanka  1.35  Denmark  0.07 Romania  0.21  Iceland  -0.50 
25  Sri Lanka  0.86  New Zealand  1.24  Cyprus  0.05  Kenya  0.20  St. Lucia  -0.48 
26 South  Africa  0.86  St.  Lucia  1.15  Romania  0.05 India  0.15  Brazil  -0.46 
27 Switzerland  0.65  Australia  1.06  Algeria  0.04 Bolivia  0.14  Cyprus  -0.46 
28 Australia  0.63  India  1.06  Saudi  Arabia 0.03 Algeria  0.14  Japan  -0.43 
29  New Zealand  0.54  Netherlands  1.04  Paraguay  0.03  Saudi Arabia  0.10  Tunisia  -0.42 
30 Oman  0.52  Switzerland  0.98  Ecuador  0.03 Turkey  0.08  South  Africa  -0.40 
31 Ireland  0.31  Finland  0.93  Peru  0.01 Chile  0.05  Croatia  -0.39 
32 Brazil  0.27  Denmark  0.91  Chile  0.01 Spain  0.03  Sri  Lanka  -0.37 
33  Tunisia 0.27  Bolivia  0.88  Turkey  0.01  Peru  0.02  Canada -0.36 
34 Denmark  0.27  Paraguay  0.80  Bangladesh  0.00 Japan  0.02  Peru  -0.31  
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35 Japan  0.25  Spain  0.67  South  Africa  0.00 Bangladesh  0.01  Singapore  -0.25 
36 Sweden  0.25  Peru  0.66  Belize  0.00 Belize  0.01  Bolivia  -0.22 
37  Netherlands  0.20  Brazil  0.24  Trinidad and Tobago0.00  Trinidad and Tobago0.00  Algeria  -0.07 
38 St.  Lucia  0.20  Japan  0.24  Brunei  0.00 Canada  0.00  Brunei  -0.01 
39 Spain  0.20  Sweden  0.17  Jamaica  0.00 Brunei  0.00  Bangladesh  -0.01 
40 Canada  0.17  Algeria  0.11  Spain  -0.01  Jamaica  -0.01  Netherlands  0.00 
41  Chile 0.07  Chile  0.09  Japan  -0.01  Ecuador  -0.02  Chile 0.00 
42 Algeria  0.01  Macao -0.22  Colombia  -0.02  Madagascar -0.02  Switzerland  0.01 
43 Brunei  -0.03  Canada  -0.37  Madagascar  -0.02  Sri  Lanka  -0.03  Belize  0.02 
44 Saudi  Arabia  -0.07  Belize  -0.42  Brazil  -0.03  Cyprus  -0.05  Trinidad and Tobago  0.04 
45 Jamaica  -0.25  Saudi  Arabia -0.50  Sri  Lanka -0.04  Colombia -0.05  Finland  0.11 
46 Macao  -0.40  Oman  -0.51  Macao  -0.06 Ireland  -0.08  Madagascar  0.14 
47 Romania  -0.68  Romania  -0.91  Ireland  -0.15  South  Africa  -0.10  Jamaica  0.16 
48  Peru  -0.84  Trinidad and Tobago-2.74 Canada  -0.24 Macao  -0.13  Ireland  0.34 





Table 7:  Cross National Growth Regressions, with Growth in Export Sophistication as Key Regressor  
Dependent variable:  growth in real GDP per capita, 1992-2003    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log initial GDP per capita  -0.028  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
 [0.005]**  [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** 
Human  Capital  0.016 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.023 
  [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]*  [0.010] [0.011] 
Regulation  quality  0.018 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.018 
  [0.006]**  [0.007]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.007]* 
Log initial EXPY  0.032         
  [0.009]**      
Growth in log EXPY  0.252         
  [0.240]      
Log initial modified EXPY    0.005       
   [0.005]     
Growth in log modified EXPY    0.081       
   [0.153]     
Initial ATP share (narrow)      0.04     
    [0.031]    
Growth in ATP share (narrow)      0.891     
    [0.567]    
Initial ATP share (broad)        0.026   
     [0.023]   
Growth in ATP share (broad)        0.731   
     [0.388]   
Initial  log  EDI      -0.001 
      [ 0 . 0 1 5 ]  
Growth  in  log  EDI      -0.003 
      [ 0 . 4 0 7 ]  
Constant -0.06  0.12  0.16  0.162  0.17 
  [0.070]  [0.052]*  [0.033]** [0.033]** [0.095] 
Observations  41 41 41 41 39 
R-squared  0.51 0.36 0.44 0.43 0.33 
 




Table 8:  Long Sample, Panel Regressions with Fixed Effects 
 
A.  EXPY 
 
5-year  panels     
    (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS  FE  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.0103  -0.0479  -0.0113 
 [0.0027]** [0.0060]** [0.0104] 
log initial EXPY  0.0208  0.0027  0.0223 
 [0.0055]** [0.0091]  [0.0423] 
log human capital  0.0116  -0.0102  0.0088 
 [0.0027]** [0.0065]  [0.0078] 
Constant -0.059  0.3688  -0.0573 
 [0.0379]  [0.0788]** [0.3033] 
Observations  640 640 369 
R-squared  0.39 0.47  
First stage F stat      1.35 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value)        0.186 
 
 
B.  EDI 
 
5-year panels          
  (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS  FE  IV 
log initial GDP/cap  -0.0065  -0.0517  -0.0097 
 [0.0026]*  [0.0062]** [0.0054] 
Initial log EDI  -0.0117  0.004  -0.0271 
  [0.0071] [0.0191] [0.0180] 
log human capital  0.0128  -0.0256  0.0081 
 [0.0030]** [0.0079]** [0.0041]* 
Constant  0.1555 0.4266 0.2709 
 [0.0473]** [0.1136]** [0.1222]* 
Observations  475 475 314 
R-squared  0.43 0.59  
First stage F stat      3.08 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value)        0.089 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in brackets;  The instruments are professions and educational 
background of political leaders from Dreher, Lamla, Lein, and Somogyi (2008).  
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Appendix Table 1: HS products excluded from export data  
HS Code  Description  HS Code Description 
01-24 Agricultural  products  25-27 Mineral  products 
4103  Other raw hides and skins (fresh, o  8002  Tin waste and scrap. 
4104  Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8101  Tungsten (wolfram) and articles the 
4105  Tanned or crust skins of sheep or l  8102  Molybdenum and articles thereof, in 
4106  Tanned or crust hides and skins of  8103  Tantalum and articles thereof, incl 
4402  Wood charcoal (including shell or n  8104  Magnesium and articles thereof, inc 
4403  Wood in the rough, whether or not s  8105  Cobalt mattes and other intermediate 
7201  Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs,  8106  Bismuth and articles thereof, inclu 
7202  Ferro-alloys.  8107  Cadmium and articles thereof, inclu 
7204  Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting  8108  Titanium and articles thereof, incl 
7404  Copper waste and scrap.  8109  Zirconium and articles thereof, inc 
7501  Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters  8110  Antimony and articles thereof, incl 
7502  Unwrought nickel.  8111  Manganese and articles thereof, inc 
7503  Nickel waste and scrap.  8112  Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van 
7601  Unwrought aluminium.  8113  Cermets and articles thereof, inclu 
7602  Aluminium waste and scrap.  9701  Paintings, drawings and pastels, ex 
7801  Unwrought lead.  9702  Original engravings, prints and lit 
7802  Lead waste and scrap.  9703  Original sculptures and statuary, i 
7901  Unwrought zinc.  9704  Postage or revenue stamps, stamp-po 
7902  Zinc waste and scrap.  9705  Collections and collectors' pieces 
8001  Unwrought tin.  9706  Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years 
530521  Coconut, abaca (Manila hemp or Musa  811252  Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van 




Appendix Table 2: Countries (165) included in the sample used in cross country regression 
Code  Reporting Country  # Year 
reported 
Code  Reporting Country  No. Year 
reported 
Code  Reporting Country  No. Year 
reported 
ABW  Aruba  5  GBR  United Kingdom  14  NCL  New Caledonia  8 
AIA Anguila  6  GEO  Georgia  11  NER  Niger  11 
ALB Albania  11  GHA Ghana  10  NGA Nigeria  8 
AND Andorra  12  GIN  Guinea  8  NIC  Nicaragua  14 
ARG Argentina  14  GMB Gambia,  The 12  NLD  Netherlands 15 
ARM Armenia  9  GRC  Greece  15  NOR Norway  14 
AUS Australia  15  GRD Grenada  14  NPL Nepal  5 
AUT Austria  13  GRL Greenland 13  NZL  New  Zealand  15 
AZE Azerbaijan  11  GTM  Guatemala  14  OMN  Oman  15 
BDI Burundi  14  GUY  Guyana  10  PAK  Pakistan  4 
BEL  Belgium  8  HKG  Hong Kong, China  14  PAN  Panama  12 
BEN Benin  8  HND Honduras  13  PER Peru  14 
BFA Burkina  Faso  10  HRV Croatia  15  PHL Philippines  11 
BGD Bangladesh  12  HTI  Haiti  6  PNG Papua  New  Guinea  6 
BGR Bulgaria  11  HUN Hungary  15  POL Poland  13 
BHR Bahrain  7  IDN  Indonesia  15  PRT  Portugal  15 
BHS Bahamas,  The  6  IND India  15  PRY Paraguay  15 
BIH  Bosnia and Herzegovina  4  IRL  Ireland 15  PYF  French  Polynesia  11 
BLR Belarus  9  IRN  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  10  QAT Qatar  7 
BLZ Belize  15  ISL  Iceland  15  ROM  Romania  15 
BOL Bolivia  15  ISR  Israel  12  RUS Russian  Federation  11 
BRA Brazil  15  ITA  Italy  13  RWA  Rwanda  10 
BRB Barbados  10  JAM Jamaica  13  SAU Saudi  Arabia  14 
BRN Brunei  9  JOR  Jordan  12  SDN Sudan  12 
BTN Bhutan  4  JPN  Japan  15  SEN Senegal  11 
BWA Botswana  7  KAZ  Kazakhstan  7  SER  Yugoslavia  11 
CAF  Central African Republic  13  KEN  Kenya  11  SGP  Singapore  15 
CAN  Canada  15  KGZ  Kyrgyz Republic  9  SLV  El Salvador  13 
CHE Switzerland  15  KHM  Cambodia  5  STP  Sao Tome and Principe  8 
CHL Chile  15  KIR  Kiribati  6  SUR Suriname  6 
CHN  China  15  KNA  St. Kitts and Nevis  13  SVK  Slovak Republic  13 
CIV  Cote d'Ivoire  12  KOR  Korea, Rep.  15  SVN  Slovenia  13 
CMR Cameroon  10  LBN  Lebanon  8  SWE Sweden  15 
COK  Cook Islands  4  LCA  St. Lucia  15  SWZ  Swaziland  6 
COL Colombia  15  LKA Sri  Lanka  9  SYC Seychelles  11 
COM Comoros  10  LSO  Lesotho  5  SYR  Syrian  Arab  Republic  6 
CPV Cape  Verde  10  LTU Lithuania  13  TCA  Turks and Caicos Isl.  6 
CRI  Costa  Rica  13  LUX Luxembourg  8  TGO Togo  12 
CUB Cuba  8  LVA Latvia  13  THA Thailand  15 
CYP Cyprus  15  MAC  Macao  14  TTO  Trinidad and Tobago  15 
CZE Czech  Republic  14  MAR  Morocco  14  TUN Tunisia  15 
DEU Germany  15  MDA  Moldova  11  TUR Turkey  15 
DMA Dominica  13  MDG Madagascar  15  TWN Taiwan,  China  10 
DNK Denmark  15  MDV Maldives  12  TZA  Tanzania  10 
DZA Algeria  15  MEX Mexico  15  UGA Uganda  13 
ECU Ecuador  15  MKD  Macedonia,  FYR  13  UKR Ukraine  11 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  13  MLI  Mali  11  URY  Uruguay  13  
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ESP Spain  15  MLT  Malta  13  USA  United  States  15 
EST  Estonia  12  MNG  Mongolia  11  VCT  St. Vincent and the 
Grena 
14 
ETH Ethiopia(excludes  Eritrea  11  MOZ  Mozambique  7  VEN Venezuela  13 
FIN Finland  15  MSR  Montserrat  8  VNM  Vietnam  6 
FJI Fiji  6  MUS  Mauritius  14  WSM  Samoa  5 
FRA France  13  MWI  Malawi  13  ZAF South  Africa  15 
FRO  Faeroe  Islands  11  MYS Malaysia  15  ZMB Zambia  12 
GAB Gabon  13  NAM  Namibia  7  ZWE Zimbabwe  6 
  
 